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The Interaction between  
China, Japan, and Korea in the Export Market† 
By KYU-CHUL JUNG* 
This paper analyzes changes in the export potential and 
competitiveness of China, Japan, and Korea. The analysis of Japan’s 
export market share reveals that in sectors where Korea’s potential 
was strong in the early 1990s, Japan’s market share diminished. This 
suggests the possibility that Korea was catching up with Japan, eating 
into Japan’s market share. The same analysis of Korea’s export market 
share in the 2000s shows, for items in which China’s export potential 
was high, Korea’s market share has declined comparatively since 
2010, with the tendency growing much larger. China’s export potential 
continues to expand in markets for Korea’s key export products, 
making it difficult to rule out the possibility that Korea’s 
competitiveness in key export products will be hindered, driven by the 
catching up of China. To respond to these challenges, it is important 
for Korea continuously to foster and enhance creative and core 
capabilities that latecomers will not easily be able to emulate. 
Key Word: catch up, product space, export market competition, 
comparative advantage, export potential 
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   I. Introduction 
 
orea has pursued export-driven growth since its initial development stage, and 
exports are still a major growth engine of Korea. It is inevitable that small 
economies such as Korea seek growth by relying on foreign demand. Thus, to 
determine whether Korea can sustain its economic dynamism, it is necessary to 
grasp whether the country can maintain its competitiveness in the export market in 
the future. 
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FIGURE 1. GLOBAL EXPORT MARKET SHARES OF  
CHINA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
This paper studies the impacts of export competitors on Japan’s exports in the 
1990s and on Korea’s exports in the 2000s and compares them. As reported in Cho 
(2014), the Korean economy of today and the Japanese economy in the early 1990s 
are similar in many respects. For example, Korea’s demographic structure follows 
Japan’s, with a lag of approximately 20 years, and Korea’s inflation rate is 
declining, as Japan’s was in the early 1990s. Given that Japan’s long recession 
started at that time, it is meaningful to analyze the possibility that in the near future 
the Korean economy will follow the way of Japan. This paper analyzes the 
Japanese and Korean economies, focusing on the export sector. 
Here, we examine what happened with regard to Japan’s exports. In the early 
1980s, Japan achieved economic growth with a rapid expansion of its export 
market dominance, but later experienced an economic downturn in the 1990s, with 
exports also sluggish. Figure 1 shows the trend of Japan’s export market share. 
Japan’s export market share was extended in the early 1980s, maintaining a high 
level until the beginning of the 1990s. The market share, however, began 
consistently to decline after reaching its peak in 1993. Japan’s market share was 
9.6% in 1993, following the US at 12.3% and Germany at 10.1%. However, it has 
since continued to fall, reaching a level of 3.6% in 2014. It is comprehensible that 
Japan’s domestic demand declined during the recession of the 1990s to some 
extent. This is, however, different from the recession experiences in other countries 
in that the Japanese economic downturn appeared even in the export sector, which 
mainly depends on foreign demand in the short term. In other words, in a recession 
exports are expected to expand more than domestic demand and thus to somewhat 
mitigate the economic downturn, but a further analysis reveals that this does not 
apply in Japan’s case. Thus, it is difficult to attribute the sluggish Japanese 
economy in the 1990s to insufficient demand, as the Japanese economy went 
through a slump in both its domestic and foreign markets at that time. Instead, it 
may be a signal that Japanese firms became less competitive. 
There were numerous factors that weakened the competitiveness of Japanese 
firms. Examples include changes in the demographic structure of the country, labor 
market rigidity, inefficient resource allocation, and mismanaged macroeconomic 
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policies. Because the analyses of these factors are covered in detail in other 
chapters of Cho (2014), this paper will focus mainly on the impact of export 
competitors. 
The exchange rate of the yen may affect the competitiveness of Japanese goods. 
Due to the Plaza Accord in 1985 and following Japan’s monetary policy, the 
yen/dollar exchange rate (annual average) dropped from 238.5 in 1985 to 94.0 in 
1995. The appreciation of the yen deteriorated the price competitiveness of 
Japanese goods in the global market. As Obstfeld (2011) reported, this significant 
appreciation clearly also affected Japan’s export market share. Although the 
exchange rate of the yen is an important issue, this paper does not address this issue 
in depth. Instead, the dynamic competition among China, Japan, and Korea is the 
main topic here. 
In contrast to Japan, China’s market share increased from 1.8% in 1990 to 12.4% 
in 2014. In particular, China’s market share skyrocketed in 2000s. Despite the rapid 
rise of China, Korea’s market share has grown at a comparatively steady pace. 
Korea’s market share was close to 2% in the early 1990s; it continued to expand 
moderately, reaching 3% in 2010, and has maintained this level since then. 
If Korea follows Japan and Korean firms become less competitive in the export 
market, the impact on Korea would be severer, as Korea relies more on exports for 
economic growth than Japan did. The ratio of exports to GDP of Japan in the early 
1990s was only approximately 10%, while that of Korea today is greater than 50%. 
These figures themselves may mislead, as Korea is more involved in global value 
chains than Japan was and hence a percentage of Korea’s exports consists of 
imported inputs, which do not contribute to Korea’s GDP directly. (See Koopman, 
Wang, and Wei 2014; Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, and de Vries 2014; Johnson 
2014 for double counting in gross exports.) After controlling for imported inputs in 
the export production figures, Korea still relies on exports much more than Japan 
did in the 1990s. Figure 2 shows the ratios of value-added exports to GDP. Japan’s 
export ratios in the 1990s were slightly less than 10%, while Korea’s export ratio in 
2011 exceeded 30%. 
 
FIGURE 2. RATIOS OF VALUE-ADDED EXPORTS TO GDP  
Source: Author’s calculations using WIOD data. 
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As Korea’s export figures have remained stagnant since the second half of 2014, 
concerns are growing in Korea that China may catch up in the export industry, 
much like Korea benchmarked Japan to do the same. A clear resolution to this issue 
is very difficult to find. This paper intends to uncover clues regarding this question 
so as to urge policymakers to prepare for this potential threat to the Korean 
economy. 
The main analysis method of this paper is based on the concept of the product 
space in Hidalgo et al. (2007). The product space is a useful tool with which to 
measure the export potential of an individual product. I measure the export 
potential of export competitors and attempt to determine how it affects a certain 
county’s export market share. 
There is, obviously, a considerable body of literature on the export 
competitiveness of China, Japan, and Korea. In this paper, I focus on the interaction 
among China, Japan, and Korea considering the catch-up efforts of the countries. 
Choi, Tcha, and Kim (2005) and Shin and Lee (2003) studied Korea’s export 
competitiveness with a focus on competition with China and Japan by analyzing 
export market shares, export basket similarities, and comparative advantages by 
industry. In contrast, this paper analyzes dynamic catch-up patterns based on the 
export potential and compares the Korean economy of today to the Japanese 
economy of the past. 
Lee (2008) and Jung (2014) also analyzed the impact of China on Korea’s 
exports, similar to this paper. These papers, however, analyzed China as an export 
market of Korean products, whereas this paper does considers countries as 
competitors in the global export market. 
Hidalgo et al. (2007) introduced the concept of the product space, upon which 
this paper is based. The product space is a useful tool for measuring a certain 
country’s capability to produce and export a certain product. They reported that it is 
more probable to have a comparative advantage in terms of a certain product, as 
products similar to the product have a comparative advantage. Hausmann, Hwang, 
and Rodrik (2007) used the product space concept and empirically showed that 
what countries produce matters in terms of economic growth. Poncet and de 
Waldemar (2015) conducted a micro-data analysis of Chinese firms and reported 
that firms tend to export more products that are closely related to products having a 
comparative advantage. The key concept used in the main analyses of those papers 
is essentially a match to that used in this paper. I apply the concept of the product 
space to the dynamic competition among China, Japan, and Korea. 
Youn (2013) and Choi (2014) also analyzed Korea’s export products using the 
concept of the product space. Youn (2013) compared the degrees of export 
complexity among the United State, Japan, Korea, and China, while Choi (2014) 
studied the relationship between participation in global value chains and export 
complexity. I expect the present paper to add to the contributions to those papers in 
how it analyzes the interaction between the three countries in terms of export 
competitiveness in a dynamic setting. 
There are papers about catching up in the export market that focus on particular 
industries, such as those of Lee and Lim (2001) and Mu and Lee (2005). The 
empirical analysis of export markets overall in this paper may complement those 
studies. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the main framework of 
the empirical analysis. Section III examines Japan’s dominance in the global export 
market in the 1990s, with emphasis on Korea’s impact on Japan. Section IV, in the 
same vein, studies China’s influence on Korea’s dominance in the export market 
since 2000, and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. The Main Framework of the Empirical Analysis 
 
This paper uses the concept of the product space as developed by Hidalgo et al. 
(2007). In this section, I introduce this concept briefly and explain how it is applied 
in this study. 
First, it is necessary to measure the comparative advantage of a certain item of a 
certain country. Following Balassa (1965), I define the revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) of a country’s item as the ratio of the share of the item in the 
country’s exports to that in the world’s exports. That is, the RCA of item i  of 
country k  is 
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where kix  is the export of item i  from country k . If a country’s RCA for an 
item is high, it indicates that the country exports the item relatively more than other 
countries, reflecting the country’s comparative advantage. RCA can be rewritten as 
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That is, a country’s RCA for an item is the ratio of the country’s dominance in 
the item’s market to that in the total export market. Given that the revealed 
comparative advantage of an item reflects the dominance of the item, RCA also 
represents the country’s export competitiveness for the item. 
At this point, I explain the concept of the product space developed by Hidalgo  
et al. (2007). With the product space, we seek to measure the capability a certain 
country has to produce a certain item. To do this, we investigate whether the 
country has a comparative advantage in items that require similar capabilities to 
produce the original item. If this country has the capability to produce the item 
effectively, it will have a comparative advantage in the near future even if it does 
not have this initially. That is, with the product space, we can measure the potential 
that a certain country will have competitiveness with regards to a certain item. For 
an intuitive explanation of the product space, one can refer to Hidalgo and 
Hausmann (2008). Several previous studies, including Hidalgo et al. (2007) and 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) found that the product space is useful for 
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predicting specialization patterns and economic growth in the near future. 
To construct the product space, we need to define the concept of the distance or 
proximity between two goods. In the product space, because we measure the export 
potential, proximity must refer to more than simple superficial similarity. If two 
items are similar in terms of the production potential, then when a country has a 
comparative advantage in one item, the country should also tend to have a 
comparative advantage in the other item. Using this concept, Hidalgo et al. (2007) 
defined proximity as the conditional probability that a country has a comparative 
advantage in one item given that the country has a comparative advantage in 
another item. That is, the proximity of items i  and j  is expressed as 
  
min{Pr( | ), Pr( | )},ij i j j iRCAx RCAx RCAx RCAx   
 
where iRCAx  represents the event that a country has a comparative advantage 
in item i . In practice, we calculate the conditional probability using its property of 
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The probabilities on the right-hand side are measured by the maximum likelihood 
estimation with the data of all countries available in a corresponding year. The 
proximity is common to all countries in a year, but it may evolve over time. 
Following Hidalgo et al. (2007), I define the export potential index (or density) 
of a certain item from a certain country as the weighted average of the transformed 
comparative advantage indices, setting the levels of similarity as the weights, 
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where )(·f  is a non-decreasing function. In this definition, the export potential 
index of an item is higher as items similar to the item tend to have higher 
comparative advantage indices. This is consistent with the definition of proximity, 
which increases in the probability that a country has comparative advantages in 
both items. 
In Hidalgo et al. (2007), the numerator on the right-hand side of eq. (1) is set to 
the sum of proximity indices of items with a comparative advantage. That is, the 
export potential (density) in the paper is defined as 
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In other words, Hidalgo et al. (2007) set ) 1(( )1k kj jRC CAf R A  , where 1(·)  
is an indicator function. Note that RCA may take any non-negative number. In this 
paper, I use a different function, )(·f , to gain more information from RCA. For 
example, we expect that the degrees of the competitiveness of items with RCA 
values of 0.99 and 1.01 are not very different. Moreover, an item with an RCA 
value of 0.99 is far more competitive than an item with an RCA value of 0.01. If 
there are a large number of items and their RCA values are spread widely, this 
restriction of the indicator function may not affect the export potential index much. 
In this paper, I do not rely on this assumption. In contrast with Hidalgo et al. 
(2007), where a discrete function was used, I define the export potential index 
using a smoothly increasing function. 
Because RCA is the ratio of an item’s share in a country’s export basket to that in 
the world’s export basket, it takes a value between zero and one for an item with a 
comparative disadvantage, whereas it is assigned a value greater than one for an 
item with a comparative advantage. Thus, the RCA value of an item with a 
comparative disadvantage is restricted to a far smaller range compared to an item 
with a comparative advantage. Thus, if the untransformed RCA is used, the export 
potential is then sensitive to items with comparative advantages. I introduce a 
transformation of RCA to adjust this property. To do this, the transformation 
function should be increasing more rapidly in the domain (0,1) than in the domain 
(1, ). In addition, a function is expected to reflect RCA better if it is a smooth 
function and its range is bounded. In sum, we need a function that is continuous, 
concave, and bounded. We consider the following function. 
 
) 1 exp(( ).k kj jRCf R A AC     
 
This function is a continuously increasing concave function, and its range is 
between zero and one. There are, of course, numerous other functions that have 
identical properties. Nevertheless, in this paper, I adopt this function, which has the 
required characteristics. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF RCA IN  
THE DEFINITION OF THE EXPORT POTENTIAL INDEX 
Note: The figure on the left shows the transformation of RCA in Hidalgo et al. (2007), and 
the figure on the right shows this for the transformation in this paper 
0
1
2
0 1 2 3
RCA
0
1
2
0 1 2 3
RCA
52 KDI Journal of Economic Policy MAY 2016 
Figure 3 compares the two transformations in Hidalgo et al. (2007) and this 
paper. The figure on the left shows the transformation used in Hidalgo et al. (2007), 
which has a discontinuity when RCA = 1. In contrast, the figure on the right shows 
the transformation used in this paper, which is continuous and strictly increasing. 
Although there is not a notable difference in the export potential indices between 
the two measures, the measure in this paper predicts future comparative advantages 
marginally better than that in Hidalgo et al. (2007). 
At this point, I explain how the product space is applied to the dynamic catch-up 
relationship in this paper. If country A chases country B, then one may expect that 
country B’s market share will gradually drop relatively further in items where 
country A’s export potential is high. That is, the current export potential of country 
A will be negatively correlated with changes in country B’s export market share in 
the future. I will test this hypothesis to analyze the evolution of Japan’s and 
Korea’s export market shares. 
 
A. Data Description 
 
In the empirical analysis, export data by country and item for each year are used. 
In this paper, items are classified according to the four-digit SITC (Standard 
International Trade Classification). Although HS (Harmonized System) is more 
commonly used than SITC, the latter reflects the processing stage better than the 
former. Hidalgo et al. (2007) also classified items according to the four-digit SITC. 
The data source is the UN Comtrade Database (retrieved on November 26, 2014). 
Data for Korea and Japan by item are available starting in 1988, while those of 
China are available starting in 1992. Thus, I used the data from 1992, as they cover 
the beginning of the period when Japan’s exports declined. Note that to construct 
the product space, data from a sufficient number of countries are needed. When I 
collected the data for this paper, not enough countries reported detailed export data 
for 2013. If the data of 2013 are used, the product space for 2012 may be far 
different from that of 2013 because they would be constructed with very different 
sets of countries. Thus, the data from 1992 to 2012 are used. This paper studies not 
short-term cycles of exports but export trends; to clean certain idiosyncratic factors 
year by year, three-year average values are most commonly used in this paper. This 
implies that the empirical analysis in this paper ranges from 1993 (1992-1994 
average) to 2011 (2010-2012 average). 
 
B. Export Potential and Comparative Advantage 
 
To show the usefulness of the export potential (density) and to explore the 
evolution of the revealed comparative advantage, Hidalgo et al. (2007) divided 
products into three categories. Transition products are those for which 
,1990 0.5iRCA   and ,1995 1iRCA  , and undeveloped products are those for which 
,1990 0.5iRCA   and ,1995 0.5iRCA  . The third category was others. Hidalgo et al. 
(2007) found that transition products tended to have a higher density than 
undeveloped products. In words, among products that a country did not export 
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actively ( ,1990 0.5iRCA  ), those with a higher density are more likely to be exported 
in five years with a comparative advantage ( ,1995 1iRCA  ). 
Table 1 shows the relationship between the export potential and the revealed 
comparative advantage of each country. The correlation coefficients of the export 
potential in 2000 and the future revealed comparative advantage indices are all 
positive. First, the export potential and revealed comparative advantage for the 
same year (t=2000) are not perfectly correlated. The correlation coefficients are 
0.6, indicating that they measure a different property of the economy. Second, the 
correlation tends to decrease as the time gap between the export potential and the 
revealed comparative advantage becomes wider. This occurs because the export 
potential itself evolves, making it difficult to predict the export composition of the 
very distant future with only the export potential of today. 
Nevertheless, the export potential still contains information about future export 
market shares. Table 2 displays the simple regression results, showing that for 
items where Korea’s export potential index was higher by one standard deviation in 
2000 than the average, the market shares in 2006 are approximately 3.5(= 1.24e ) 
times higher than the average. While the market shares in 2011 are only 2.9 times 
higher than average, these values are nonetheless statistically significant. 
Note that the correlation coefficients of Japan do not decrease much over time. 
This may be due to the relative stability of Japan’s export structure. This pattern 
stands in contrast with those of China and Korea, whose export structures have 
been evolving relatively quickly. 
 
TABLE 1—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXPORT POTENTIAL AND  
REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Correlation coefficients of the export potential in 2000 and the revealed 
comparative advantage for each year 
Correlation coefficients China Korea Japan 
Revealed comparative advantage in 2000 0.62*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 
Revealed comparative advantage in 2006 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 
Revealed comparative advantage in 2011 0.37*** 0.45*** 0.60*** 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE 2—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOREA’S EXPORT POTENTIAL AND  
EXPORT MARKET SHARES 
Regression model: 
0 , 1, , 2000
ln
it t t i it
exportpotentialmarketshare       
Year of  
dependent variables Regression coefficients 1, t  t-statistics 
t=2000 1.49*** (27.9) 
t=2006 1.24*** (20.7) 
t= 2011 1.05*** (16.3) 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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III. Japan’s Experience in the 1990s 
 
This section analyzes Japan’s dominance in the global export market in the 
1990s based on neighbor countries catching up with Japan. As shown in Figure 1, 
Japan’s dominance in the global export market started to decline in 1993. First, this 
paper looks at the composition of Japan’s export basket and how it changed in the 
1990s. 
In the 1990s, Japan’s exports were concentrated in the sector of machinery and 
transport equipment (SITC #7). Japan’s export dominance in that sector was 
rapidly dwindling, however, in the 1990s. Japan’s market share in the sector was 
18.0% in 1992-1994; shrinking to 12.3% by the end of the 1990s. In contrast, the 
market shares in this sector of Korea and China increased from 2.6% and 1.1% to 
3.4% and 2.6%, respectively, during the same period. This suggests the possibility 
that the latecomers ate into Japan’s share of its key export markets. 
Next, I examine the systematic relationship between Japan’s market share and its 
competitors’ export potential. If Korea or China caught up with Japan, it is 
expected that Japan’s market shares would decline relatively more in the sectors 
where Korea’s or China’s export potential levels were high. The regression model 
is expressed as 
 
,1999 ,1993 0 1 ,1993 2 ,1993 3 ,1993ln( ) ln( ) .
JPN JPJPN KOR CHN
i i i i i
N
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FIGURE 4. JAPAN’S EXPORT MARKET SHARE BY ITEM 
Note: One-digit SITC descriptions are as follows. 
0: Food and live animals, 
1: Beverages and tobacco,  
2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels,  
3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials,  
4: Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes,  
5: Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.,  
6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material,  
7: Machinery and transport equipment,  
8: Miscellaneous manufactured articles,  
9: Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC. 
Source: UN Comtrade Database 
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The dependent variable is the rates of change of Japan’s comparative advantage 
index in the 1990s. The main independent variables are Korea’s and China’s export 
potential levels for the starting year of the measured period. Because Japan’s own 
export potential may also affect the change in Japan’s market share, I control for 
Japan’s potential in the starting year of the measured period. 
Note that the dependent variable is the log difference (growth rate) of the 
comparative advantage indices. Given that RCA is the ratio of a country’s 
dominance in an item’s market to that in the total export market, the dependent 
variable also indicates the growth rate of the item’s export market share. We can 
see this from the following equations: 
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I normalize the export potential such that the export potential of a certain 
country in a certain year has a mean of zero and variance of one. Note that such an 
affine transformation does not affect the t-statistics of the coefficient estimates. The 
interpretation of the regression coefficient is then straightforward. For an item of 
which Korea’s export potential is higher by one standard deviation than the average 
export potential of Korea, the expected rates of change of Japan’s export market 
share from 1993 to 1999 is higher by 1  than the average rates of change of 
Japan’s export market shares. 
The empirical analysis shows that for items in which Korea showed high export 
potential levels, Japan’s market share decreased. This finding indicates that a fall in 
Japan’s market share of a certain item was contingent on the pace at which Korea 
caught up. In Table 3, a significantly negative regression coefficient for Korea’s 
export potential indicates that Japan’s market share has dropped comparatively  
 
TABLE 3—IMPACT OF KOREA AND CHINA ON  
JAPAN’S EXPORT MARKET SHARE IN THE 1990S 
Dependent variable: rates of change of Japan’s export market shares 
between 1993 and 1999 
Independent variables Regression coefficients t-statistics 
Korea’s potential in 1993 -0.14** (-2.32) 
China’s potential in 1993 0.00 (0.01) 
Japan’s potential in 1993 -0.01 (-0.33) 
constant -0.03 (-1.27) 
Number of observations 1,031 
R-squared 0.03 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 4—IMPACT OF KOREA AND CHINA ON JAPAN’S EXPORT MARKET SHARE IN  
THE 1990S WITH DIFFERENT TIME GAPS 
Dependent variables: 
(1) rates of change of Japan’s export market shares between 1993 and 1999 (baseline) 
(2) rates of change of Japan’s export market shares between 1993 and 1998 
(3) rates of change of Japan’s export market shares between 1993 and 1997 
(4) rates of change of Japan’s export market shares between 1993 and 1996 
Independent variables 
Measured periods 
(1) 
t=1993 
to 1999 
(2) 
t=1993 
to 1998 
(3) 
t=1993 
to 1997 
(4) 
t=1993 
to 1996 
Korea’s potential in 1993 -0.14** 
(-2.32) 
-0.12* 
(-1.96) 
-0.11* 
(-1.96) 
-0.04 
(-1.02) 
China’s potential in 1993 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.03 
(0.40) 
-0.02 
(-0.45) 
Japan’s potential in 1993 -0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
Constant -0.03 
(-1.27) 
-0.05* 
(-1.85) 
-0.05** 
(-2.08) 
-0.02 
(-1.20) 
Number of observations 1,031 1,031 1,031 1,031 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
further in sectors where Korea’s potential is high. In items where Korea’s export 
potential index was higher by one standard deviation in 1993, the rates of change 
of Japan’s market share dropped by nearly 14 percentage points more, meaning that 
Korea’s impact on the changes in Japan’s market share was significant. In contrast, 
when Korea’s potential was controlled for, China’s impact on Japan’s export shares 
was statistically insignificant. This result does not necessarily imply that China’s 
overall impact on Japan’s export was negligible. Note that the analysis controls for 
countries’ average export market shares across items. If a country’s market shares 
for all items increased at the same rate, the analysis cannot capture this data. The 
regression results simply indicate that China did not have a significant impact on 
Japan’s exports, particularly for items whose market shares dropped in the 1990s at 
a rate greater than the average. Because China’s global export share increased from 
2.4% to 3.4%, it is still possible that China caused the decline in Japan’s overall 
export market share. 
Of course, Korea’s export potential alone may not explain most of the change in 
Japan’s export market share for each item. The regression shows only the trend in 
the change pattern for Japan’s export market composition in the 1990s. Because the 
regression includes only a few independent variables, it is also possible that 
omitted-variable bias exists. Note that the dependent variables are the relative 
changes in the market shares. Thus, it is less likely that the regression result 
depends on Japan’s macroeconomic environment. However, it is still possible that 
countries other than Korea and China systematically affected Japan’s export market 
shares. As presented previously, the US and Germany were the major exporters in 
the early 1990s. They may affect the export market competence levels of both 
Japan and Korea. To examine this, I also include the export potential of the US 
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and/or Germany as independent variables. The regression coefficients for these 
variables were statistically insignificant while regression coefficients of Korea’s 
export potential were nearly identical to the baseline results. 
In the empirical analysis in this section, I establish a six-year gap to cover the 
period from 1993 and 1999. I set the starting year as 1993, as Japan’s export 
dominance started to decline in 1993 and China’s data are available starting only in 
1993. I set the ending year to 1999 to cover the 1990s. I found that a shorter time 
gap leads to a smaller regression coefficient for Korea’s export potential, meaning 
that it takes time for latecomers to catch up. Table 4 shows the results with different 
time gaps. For the cases with the five-year and the four-year gaps, the coefficients 
of Korea’s export potential are marginally insignificant at 5 percent with the p-
values of 0.0507 and 0.0503, respectively, while with a three-year gap, the 
coefficient is insignificant at 10 percent. 
 
IV. Korea’s Export Competitiveness and China’s Catch-up Actions 
 
In this section, I examine Korea’s export competitiveness of today through the 
lens of Japan’s experience of the 1990s. 
First, similar portfolios of export products were noted for Japan in the past and 
Korea recently. Figure 5 shows the export basket for Japan and Korea for these two 
respective eras. Both countries have particularly high market shares in the 
machinery and transport equipment sector (SITC #7). They have also relatively 
high shares in the chemicals and related products sector (#5) and in manufactured 
goods classified chiefly by materials (#6). Note that the market share of Japan in 
the machinery and transport equipment sector dropped rapidly in the 1990s. On the 
one hand, concerns arise that Korea’s market shares may decline in key export 
markets, such as electrical and electronic products, ships, and iron and steel, due to 
latecomers which eventually catch up with Korea, similar to Japan in the 1990s. On 
the other hand, the similarity of the export portfolios may result from Korea’s 
benchmarking Japan for a long time. 
If Korea caught up with Japan in these sectors, latecomers may then also easily 
be able to catch up with Korea in the same sectors. Of course, it is difficult to 
determine whether Korea will follow Japan or not by merely comparing their 
export portfolios. To uncover a clue about Korea’s export competitiveness in the 
future, I undertake the same empirical analysis used in the previous section. 
At this stage, I analyze the impact of China’s and Japan’s export potential levels 
at a certain point in time on Korea’s export market share after that point in time. 
The empirical method used here is identical to that in the analysis of Japan’s export 
competitiveness. The regression model is expressed as 
 
, 6 , 0, 1, , 2, , 3, , ,ln( ) ln( ) .
KOR KOR CHN JPN KOR
i t i t t t i t t i t t i t i tRCA RCA w w w           
 
The dependent variable is the rate of change of each export-market share (or 
revealed comparative advantage index) of Korea. The main independent variables 
are the export potential indices of China and Japan at the beginning of the year of  
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FIGURE 5. REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN AND KOREA BY ITEM 
Note: One-digit SITC descriptions are as follows. 
0: Food and live animals, 
1: Beverages and tobacco,  
2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels,  
3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials,  
4: Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes,  
5: Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.,  
6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material,  
7: Machinery and transport equipment,  
8: Miscellaneous manufactured articles,  
9: Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC. 
Source: UN Comtrade Database 
 
the measured period. As before, I control for Korea’s export potential index and set 
the time gap to six years. 
Table 5 shows the empirical results year by year. Until the early 2000s, the 
regression coefficient of China’s potential remained insignificant, meaning that 
there were no noticeable inclinations at that time between the rates of change in 
Korea’s market shares and China’s export potential. However, as the coefficient 
decreased gradually to show a statistically significant negative correlation in the 
mid-2000s, Korea’s market shares started to decrease comparatively in the sectors 
where China’s export potential levels were high. For items where China’s export 
potential index was higher by one standard deviation in 2005, the rate of change of 
Korea’s market share dropped by nearly 21 percentage points more in 2011. Note 
that China’s negative regression coefficient of its export potential is gradually 
rising. This implies that the impact of its catching up with Korea on Korea’s market 
share is growing. 
The coefficients of Korea’s export potential, which is a control variable, are all 
negative and statistically significant. Recall that Korea’s export potential was 
positively correlated with Korea’s current and future market shares and that the 
correlation with current market shares is higher than that with future market shares. 
These findings imply that Korea’s export potential is negatively correlated with the 
future rates of change of its market shares. I set the future rate of change of the 
market shares as the dependent variable instead of the future market shares because 
market shares are persistent. If future market shares were set as a dependent 
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TABLE 5—IMPACT OF CHINA AND JAPAN ON  
KOREA’S EXPORT MARKET SHARE IN THE 2000S 
Dependent variable: rates of change of Korea’s export market shares between t and t+6 
Independent variables 
Measured periods 
t=2000 
to 2006 
t=2001 
to 2007 
t=2002 
to 2008 
t=2003 
to 2009 
t=2004 
to 2010 
t=2005 
to 2011 
China’s potential in t 0.13* 
(1.66) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
-0.11 
(-1.34) 
-0.16** 
(-2.21) 
-0.21*** 
(-3.09) 
Japan’s potential in t 0.46*** 
(6.66) 
0.38*** 
(5.14) 
0.38*** 
(4.39) 
0.35***
(3.88) 
0.33*** 
(3.50) 
0.27*** 
(2.75) 
Korea’s potential in t -0.49*** 
(-6.40) 
-0.45*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.47*** 
(-5.41) 
-0.42***
(-4.53) 
-0.40*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.33*** 
(-3.17) 
constant -0.18*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.19*** 
(-5.31) 
-0.22*** 
(-5.73) 
-0.14*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.45) 
-0.04 
(-1.04) 
Number of observations 1,031 1,031 1,031 1,031 1,031 1,031 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
variable, the regression result may mislead us in that a low market share of an item 
may not be caused by the impacts of other countries but by Korea’s poor 
performance with regard to the item in question in the past. That is, by constructing 
the regression model, it is likely that the coefficient of Korea’s potential is 
negative. Hence, the interpretation of the coefficient of Korea’s export potential 
should be cautious, and one should not give weight to it. In the regression analysis 
of Japan’s market shares, the coefficient of Japan’s potential is statistically 
insignificant. As shown in Section II, the correlation of Japan’s export potential and 
future market shares does not decrease over time, which implies that Japan’s export 
potential may not be significantly correlated with future changes in market shares. 
The main difference between Korea and Japan is likely that Japan’s export 
structure is more stable than Korea’s. 
To address this issue, I set future market shares as a dependent variable and 
Korea’s current market shares and export potential as control variables. The 
qualitative results are virtually identical to the baseline. 
These results are consistent with those of Amiti and Freund (2010). Their paper 
analyzed the evolution of China’s export structure, finding that machinery and 
transport equipment (SITC #7) grew most strongly and that within the category 
telecoms (SITC #76), electrical machinery (SITC #77), and office machines (SITC 
#75) experienced the fastest growth. These were Korea’s key export sectors in the 
early 2000s. While Korea has maintained its market share in electrical machinery, 
Korea’s market shares in telecoms and office machines have been dropping, while 
China’s market shares in these areas have been increasing to high levels. China’s 
comparative advantage indices for these sectors in 2012 are 3.1 (SITC #75), 2.5 
(SITC #76), and 1.5 (SITC #77). Thus, the results in Amiti and Freund (2010) 
partly support the claim of this paper. 
Determining with regard to China which sectors have been catching up with 
Korea is important. If China has affected Korea’s market shares in sectors where 
Korea does not have a comparative advantage, Korea may not need to worry much. 
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FIGURE 6. THE CORRELATION OF  
KOREA’S REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND  
CHINA’S EXPORT POTENTIAL INDICES 
Note: For each year, we calculate the simple correlation coefficient of Korea’s 
RCA and China’s export potential indices across products. 
 
In contrast, if China has been chasing Korea in Korea’s key export markets, this 
would represent a critical problem that Korea should address. 
China’s potential continues to grow in items where Korea has a high export 
market share. This implies that there may be a considerable burden on Korea to 
sustain its export competitiveness in key export items in the future. Figure 6 shows 
that the correlation coefficient between Korea’s comparative advantage index and 
China’s export potential index has gradually widened since 2003, indicating 
China’s intensifying catch-up efforts with Korea in items where Korea’s market 
share is large. If this trend continues, it is highly likely that, much like Japan in the 
1990s, Korea could experience a decrease in its market dominance in key export 
items due to the increasing competition from latecomers, including China. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper found that Korea faces a similar predicament to Japan in the early 
1990s, when its long-term slump in exports began, in terms of the composition of 
export items and the catching up of latecomers. Korea’s export product 
composition in recent times has been mainly composed of machinery and transport 
equipment, showing characteristics similar to those of Japan in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, Japan’s falling export market shares of its key products in the 1990s, 
partially driven by the catch-up efforts of latecomers, have been echoed in Korea 
since 2010. 
The empirical analysis shows that in items where China’s export potential was 
high, Korea’s market dominance has posted a relative decline since 2010, with the 
tendency growing much larger. China’s export potential continues to expand in 
markets for Korea’s key export products, making it difficult to rule out the 
possibility that Korea’s competitiveness in key export products will be hindered. 
0.0
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To respond to these challenges, it is important for Korea continuously to foster 
and enhance creative and core capabilities that latecomers will not easily be able to 
emulate. Due to the catching up of latecomers, Japan’s overall export market 
dominance has weakened, but its relative strength has been sustained in sectors that 
require sophisticated technology. Sectors where Japan’s export market dominance 
has been maintained are those that require (relatively) highly advanced technology. 
Examples include specialized machinery for particular industries (SITC #72), 
metalworking machinery (SITC #73), road vehicles (SITC #78), photographic 
apparatuses, and equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and 
clocks (SITC #88). Rather than merely emulating this strategy and catching up, 
Korea now needs to take the lead in technological development and strengthen its 
own unique competitiveness, differentiated from that of latecomers. 
Furthermore, based on the recognition that the rapidly changing environment has 
left Korea with no other alternative but to change its industrial structure, it should 
formulate an economic platform that can respond to this challenge in a flexible and 
efficient manner. If the Korean economy fails promptly to shift its limited 
production resources, such as labor and capital, from industries that have a 
comparative disadvantage to those that have a comparative advantage, it could lead 
to a decline in productivity overall and hence cause a reduction in Korea’s 
competitiveness in export markets. 
The results of this paper should be interpreted cautiously. There are, of course, 
numerous factors that affect the competitiveness of a country in the global export 
market. This paper focused only on neighbor countries catching up and did not rule 
out other important factors such as changes in the demographic structure, labor 
market rigidity, inefficient resource allocation, and mismanaged macroeconomic 
policies. To grasp precisely whether Korea can maintain its competitiveness in the 
export market in the future, more comprehensive studies are needed. In addition, 
this paper did not explain why a country caught up with a particular country at a 
specific time. The analysis with cross-country panel data may help us resolve this 
issue. Another issue that this paper did not address is overseas production. Indeed, 
it is said that Japan expanded overseas productions tremendously in the 1990s. The 
decline of Japan’s export market share due to overseas production may not reflect 
the weakened competitiveness of Japanese firms. Thus, it may be a factor of the 
estimation bias that this paper did not consider the foreign direct investment and 
international fragmentation of production by multinational firms. 
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